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FEDERAL JURISDICTION
STATE RULES OF SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
Plaintiff, a resident of Virginia, sued defendant, a resident of North
Carolina, in a state court of North Carolina to recover a deficiency
resulting from exercise of a power of sale contained in a deed of trust
executed in Virginia on real estate situated in Virginia. A North
Carolina statute provided: "In all sales of real property by mortgagees
and/or trustees under powers of sale. . ., or where judgment or decree
is given for foreclosure . . . the mortgagee or trustee or holder of
notes secured by such a mortgage or deed of trust shall not be en-
titled to a deficiency judgment . . ."I Basing its decision on this
statute the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed a judgment for
plaintiff and ordered the suit dismissed.2 Thereupon, plaintiff in-
stituted suit in a federal district court in the same state and recovered.
On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, affirmed. Angel v. Bulling-
ton, 150 F. (2d) 679 (C.C.A., 4th, 1945). Cert. granted.
The groundwork for this apparent departure from the doctrine
of Erie B. Co. v. Tompkins 3 was laid by the Supreme Court of North
Carolina when it interpreted the statute only to affect the jurisdiction
of the state courts to render a deficiency judgment4 and thereby to leave
unhindered plaintiff's "substantive right." The Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, bound by this construction, accordingly held that a state could
not by statute deprive a federal court of jurisdiction.5
Had the North Carolina court interpreted the statute to express
a public policy of the state or to affect substantive rights rather than
remedial rights, it is quite possible that the federal courts would have
followed the same course as the state court. 6 Thus in one case two
triangular conflicts appear; one involving the contract clause,7 the full
faith and credit clause,8 and the doctrine of public policy of a state;
the second involving a conflict between federal jurisdiction, the public
policy of a state, and the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins. Although
the circuit court based its decision on the jurisdictional point only, it
did at least recognize the latent possibilities in the statute involving
the Federal Constitution.9
1. N. C. Laws 1933, c. 36; N. C. Gen. Stat. c. 45 §36 (1943).
2. Bullington v. Angel, 220 N. C. 18, 16 S. E. (2d) 411 (1941).
3. 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
4. Bullington v. Angel, 220 N. C. 18, 20, 16 S. E. (2d) 411, 412 (1941).
5. Angel v. Bullington, supra, 680.
6. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 175 U. S.
91 (1899); Transbel Inv. Co. v. Roth, 36 F. Supp. 396 (S. D. N. Y.
1940); May v. Mulligan, 36 F. Supp. 596 (W. D. Mich. 1939).
7. U. S. Const. Art. I, §10.
8. U. S. Const. Art IV, §1.
9. "This raises the interesting questions whether the statute as thus
interpreted runs afoul of the full faith and credit clause of . ..
the Federal Constitution or the due process clause of §1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. We do not pass on these questions." Angel
v. Bullington, supra, 681.
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It has been a rule of law since 184010 that states cannot deprive
federal courts of jurisdiction of any particular subject-matter when all
the remaining conditions necessary for federal jurisdiction are pres-
ent.11 The most recent development of this rule was in David Lupton
& Sons v. Automobile Club of America12 where the plaintiff, barred
from suing in state courts because of non-compliance with a state for-
eign corporation statute, was permitted to sue in the federal courts
sitting in the same state.
A state need not enforce, however, a foreign contract or obligation
when to do so would violate the expressed public policy of the forum
on a matter not governed by federal law or the Constitution.13 Fed-
eral Courts are likewise governed by the public policy of the state
wherein they sit.14 But to some extent the full faith and credit clause
overrules the public policy of a state, even where the matter is not
governed by federal law or the Constitution. 5 A state cannot by
simply denying its courts jurisdiction, escape its duties under the full
faith and credit clause.' 6 The same argument has been applied in hold-
ing a statute or decision expressing state policy violative of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 7
Lastly, although a state may prohibit its citizens from entering
into certain types of agreements and may declare agreements unlawful
when contravening a recognized public policy, a state may not restrict
the obligations of a contract entered into and to be performed wholly
without the state, except when it has a sufficient interest either in the
subject matter or the parties to warrant his interference. 8
The most apparent problems resulting from these rules are, first,
10. Suydam v. Broadnax, 14 Pet. 67 (U. S. 1840).
11. This rule has been followed in a long line of decisions including
Union Bank v. Vaiden, 18 How. 503 (U. S. 1855); Chicago
N. W. Ry. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270 (U. S. 1871).
12. 225 U. S. 489 (1912).
13. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. 175 U. S.
91 (1899); May v. Mulligan, 36 F. Supp. 596 (W. D. Mich. 1939).
14. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Man. Co., 313 U. S. 487 (1941); Grif-
fin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498 (1941); Transbel Inv. Co. v. Roth, 36
F. Supp. 396 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
15. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U. S. 629 (1935); Milwaukee County v.
M. E. White, 296 U. S. 268 (1935).
16. Kenny v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S. 411, 415 (1920); Broderick v.Rosner 294 U.S. 629, 642 (1935).
17. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U. S. 143,
150 (1934).
18. Id. at 149. The interest of the forum was considered sufficient in
Alaska Packers v. Industrial Ace. Comm., 294 U. S. 532 (1935)(interest in welfare of non-resident inhabitants who might become
a charge on the state) ; Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U. S. 498 (1941)(The insured was a resident of the forum); but insufficient in
Citizens Nat. Bk. v. Waugh, 78 F. (2d) 325, (C. C. A. 4th, 1935)(makers of notes were residents of forum but notes were made
and were payable in another state); John Hancock Ins. Co. v.
Yates, 299 U. S. 178 (1936) (only interest of forum was that
suit was brought there and plaintiff had become a resident of
forum after cause of action had been completed).
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a conflict between the rule of federal jurisdiction, and the doctrine of
Eiie R. Co. v. Tompkins, and, second, a conflict between the full faith
and credit and contract clauses of the Federal Constitution and the
public policy of a state.
A practical answer is needed to eliminate the unsatisfactory dis-
tinction between "substantive" and "remedial" rights. To say that
only the remedial right is affected and the substantive right remains
in existence to be enforced elsewhere affords no practical solution.
It is certainly contrary to the spirit of Brie R. Co. v. Tompkins,19 to
hold that a federal court can render a judgment which the state court
cannot, where the only basis of federal jurisdiction arises from di-
versity of citizenship and where the law applied is supposedly the
law of the state.-
The Supreme Court has recently disposed of a somewhat similar
case, involving the applicability of a state statute of limitations in a
federal court, by simply ignoring the distinction between remedial and
substantive rights and holding that whatever one calls it, the federal
court is bound by the state law.
20
To solve the problem by saying that a state cannot deprive a
federal court of jurisdiction involves a falsely implied assumption,
since no attempt is being made to deprive a federal court of juris-
diction where a state court has jurisdiction.
The deeper problem of full faith and credit and public policy of
a state cannot be disposed of so easily. Here the two lines of authority
have been moving along with no Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins situation inter-
posed. All that can be said is that each case is decided on its own
facts. 21 The court after balancing full faith and credit and considera-
tions of public policy 22 comes up with another case to support one
19. Note the now famous language of that case: "Except in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the
law to be applied in any case is the law of the state ... There is
no federal general common law." Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
supra 78. However, it appears that deviations are made from
these principles where by applying the state law as interpreted
by the state court to the facts of a particular case, the result
would render the state law unconstitutional. See Griffin V. Mc-
Coach, 313 U. S. 498, 504, 506 (1941) (where the court determined
the state law would not be unconstitutional).
20. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 323 U. S. - , 65 Sup. Ct. 1464
(1945). "It is therefore immaterial whether statutea of limitation
are characterized either as 'substantive' or 'procedural' ....
In essence, the intent of that decision (Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins)
was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising
jurisdiction because of diversity of citizenship of the parties, the
outcome of the litigation in federal court should be substantially
the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of the litiga-
tion, as it would be if tried in a state court." (p. 1470). (Mr.
Justice Rutledge and Mr. Justice Murphy dissented.)
21. Compare Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145
(1932), with Alaska Packers, v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 294 U. S.
532 (1935).
22. Note the following language in Alaska Packers v. Industrial Acc.
Comm., 294 U. S. 532 (1935): ". . . there are some limitations
upon the extent to which a state will be required by the full faith
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of the two lines of reasoning. An attempt to rationalize the two lines
so as to reach a general rule seems to be futile.
SALES
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS
Plaintiff, after making examination as a texture, color, style and
design, purchased a chenille lounging robe in defendant's department
store. Undisputed testimony disclosed that on the third or fourth
time the robe was worn, plaintiff waved or "fanned" a match after
lighting a cigarette, the robe instantly caught fire, and plaintiff was
badly burned. Plaintiff seeks damages, alleging breach of implied
warranty. From a directed verdict for defendant, plaintiff appeals.
HeZd: reversed. Lower court erred in failing to instruct the jury- that,
if the robe caught fire and burned as the witness testified, there was
a breach of defendant's implied warranty of fitness.1 Deffebach v.
Lansburgh & Bro. (D.C. 1945), 150 F. (2d) 591.
Implied warranty in the sale of goods was unknown to the com-
mon law prior to the nineteenth century,2 but in 1815 the need for
legal recognition of such warranties was realized in sales in which the
buyer had no opportunity to inspect his purchases.3 During the years
to follow the courts gradually enlarged their recognition of implied
warranties until, prior to the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act, it
had become well settled that manufacturers and producers impliedly
and credit clause to enforce even the judgment of another state,
in contravention of its own statutes or policy." (p. 546) "... . the
conflict is to be resolved, not by giving automatic effect to the
full faith and credit clause .... but by appraising the governmental
interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of decisions
according to their weight." (p. 547). "The interest of Alaska is
not shown to be superior to that of California. No persuasive
reason is shown for denying to California the right to enforce its
own laws in its own courts, and in the circumstances the full
faith and credit clause does not require that the statute of Alaska
be given that effect." (p. 550).
1. District of Columbia Code, like §§15(1) and 15(3), Uniform Sales
Act, provides that, "Where the buyer, expressly or by implication,
makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the
goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the
seller's skill or judgment * * * *, there is an implied warranty
that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose. * * * *
If the buyer has examined the goods. there is no implied warranty
as regards defects which such examination ought to have revealed."
50 Stat. 33 (1937), D.C. Code (1940) tit. 28, §1115. Thirty-seven
states, including Indiana, have adopted similar statutes. Cf. IND.
STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) §58-115. Restatement, "Uniform Re-
vised Sales Act" (Proposed Final Draft, 1944) §§39 and 41(2)(a),
and the English Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71,
§14(1) contain similar provisions.
2. None but express warranties were recognized in the early decisions.
Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4 (1606-1607); Ames, "History of
Assumpsit" (1888) 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8.
3. Gardner v. Gray, 4 Camnpb. 144 (N.P. 1815); Williston, "Sales"
(2d ed. 1924) §228.
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